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Abstract
[In this article I compare how American and German judges
conceptualize the harm the headscarf poses to society. My
examples are the 2003 Ludin case, in which the German Federal
Constitutional Court held that the civil service, in the absence of
state regulation, could not reject a woman from a civil service
teaching position solely because she would not remove her
headscarf while teaching; and State v. Freeman, in which a
Florida court held that a woman could not pose for a drivers
license wearing a garment (the niqab) that covered all of her face
except her eyes. While judges and legal critics in both countries
tended to see the headscarf as threatening, Germans were more
likely to see it as a symbol of political Islam, while Americans saw
it a tool used by potential terrorists.]
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I.
SYMBOLIC THREATS
Societies ask courts to repudiate symbols they find threatening. For
example, German courts repudiate Holocaust denial; courts in the
American South repudiate cross burnings and Ku Klux Klan masks.2 The
symbols, however, do not have meaning by themselves. Instead, it is up to
1
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the court to attribute meaning to them. In this process, the courts often
privilege the concerns of the specific society they operate in.
Consequently, courts in different settings—or different societies—will
treat the same symbol differently. To explore this point, this essay will
look at two cases involving the Muslim headscarf—one from Germany,
the other from the United States. The essay has two goals. First, it will
show that, although legal discourses surrounding both cases treat the
headscarf as a threat, the threats themselves were presented differently.
Second, somewhat more speculatively, the essay will trace the reasons for
the different perceptions of threat to differences in how Germans and
Americans view religion in general and Muslims in particular.
The German case began in 1998, when a series of German courts
debated whether the school authorities in Stuttgart could deny a civil
service position as an elementary school teacher to Fereshta Ludin, an
Afghani woman, solely because she refused to take off her headscarf while
teaching. Ultimately in 2003 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in
3
Ludin’s favor, but only because the state of Baden-Württemberg did not
specifically ban headscarves4 (a failing the state legislature speedily
remedied the following year).5 Central to the legal debate was whether
wearing a headscarf was consistent with the civil service official’s duty to
6
neutrality and moderation. In this context, the headscarf raised two fears:
(i) religious conversion—the court repeatedly expressed the concern that
the sight of an authority figure wearing a headscarf would lead the pupils
to adopt Ms. Ludin’s views—even though she repeatedly claimed no
interest in this and was even willing to tell her students that the headscarf
was a “fashion accessory;”7 and (ii) political Islam—here the courts
repeatedly drew a connection between Ms. Ludin’s headscarf and Islamist
movements, especially those that sought to repress women.8
The case of Sultaana Freeman raised different threats. In early
2001 Ms. Freeman, an American born convert to Islam, posed for a
Florida state driver’s license wearing a niqab—a garment that covered her
entire face, save for her eyes. She was allowed to do so. In December
2001 she was ordered to surrender her license and submit to a photo
3
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without her niqab. In response, she sued under Florida’s Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). In June, 2003—after a three day trial
9
that aired on Court TV—Judge Janet Thorpe rejected her request. To get
around precedent extending similar rights to isolationist Christian sects in
the 1970s and 1980s,10 Judge Thorpe observed that times had changed
since then—noting both the increase in technology and the new threat of
“foreign and domestic” terrorism.11 Although she assured her readers that
“most likely” Ms. Freeman was not a terrorist, the headscarf did not get
off as easily.12 Repeatedly in her ruling she stressed the headscarf as the
means for accomplishing terrorist acts, especially the idea that an
“insincere” terrorist could threaten the national security by falsely posing
as a religious Muslim at the DMV.13 Some of the media commentators
who observed the trial harped on this point, relying on reports that Ms.
14
Freeman’s husband had been caught with phony identification cards.
Part II of this essay will examine the Ludin case in detail. First it
will show how Germans view the threat posed by Political Islam through
the lens of their totalitarian past. It will then discuss the view that
Germany is a Christian country and the widely shared opposition to a rigid
separation of church and state. Then it will show how these ideas
manifested themselves both in the decision of the majority and dissenters
of the Federal Constitutional Court as well as in the reaction to the case by
political leaders, activists and other commentators.
Part III turns to the Freeman case. It will show how the trial judge,
Janet Thorpe, made rulings on the question of Ms. Freeman’s sincerity and
experience of a burden that go against earlier precedents involving
Christian religious groups. It will also show how Judge Thorpe’s decision
to craft her opinion in this way reflected a societal fear of terrorism in the
wake of September 11th and, to a lesser extent, a suspicion of Americans
who convert to Islam. Finally, Part III will show how Judge Thorpe’s
rulings on sincerity and burden were not necessary—she could have
reached the same conclusion by holding that states had a compelling
interest in banning women from posing for driver’s licenses while wearing
the niqab.
The Conclusion notes the strong differences between the two
cases. While the Germans viewed Fereshta Ludin’s headscarf as a symbol
of totalitarianism, Americans saw Sultanna Freeman as a potential
9
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terrorist. These differences suggest that Western constitutional
democracies, when confronting the challenge posed by Islamic migrants,
will fall back on their own fears and traditions.
II.
GERMANY: THE HEADSCARF AS POLITICAL THREAT
A. Migration, Feminism, and Political Islam
Fereshta Ludin’s headscarf touched off a number of fears for
Germans about Muslims and their impact on German society. There are
about 3.2 million Muslims in Germany, or just under 4% of the
15
population. Although many are from Turkey—the result of employment
as guest workers during the Wirtschaftswunder, there are also a large
number of Muslims from other countries, especially Iran.16 Moreover,
while it is customary to think of Turkey as a secular Muslim country, not
all Turks in Germany are secular. Instead, many are religious. In fact the
Milli Görüs, a Muslim fundamentalist group that attracts primarly Turks,
has a large presence in Germany.17
Before the mid-1990s the image of Turks was one of victim.
Extreme right wing circles added old slurs against the Jews with new ones
about Turks.18 Song lyrics also featured the Turk as target.19 These fears
drew deep resonance at a time when Europeans were expressing doubt
about the political stability of a reunified Germany.20 The 1992
firebombing at Mölln, which led to the deaths of four Turkish guest
workers helped spark a nationwide response to the problem of antiforeigner violence21 (a problem that unfortunately still persists as followers
15
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of the World Cup will notice).22 As the 1990s persisted, the image of the
Turk—and by extension the Muslim—began to improve. With the election
of Schröder in 1998 and the opening of German citizenship to Turks, the
23
image of immigrants began to change. However, despite gaining the
option of citizenship, many Turks still cluster around menial jobs.24
Meanwhile, Germans began to pay more attention to Islam. Within
a decade the Turks went from being the next victims of the Nazis to
becoming potential Nazis themselves. Despite the failure of the German
public officials to stop Hitler’s rise to power in the 1920s and 30s, the civil
service was and is portrayed as a bulwark against the political parties who
would corrupt the state.25 The concern about the civil service came to a
head in 1972 with the Radicals Decree which sought to purge political
26
extremists from the civil service. Likewise, some of the participants in
the headscarf debate saw Fereshta Ludin as a potential extremist.
However, the fears about political Islam were not limited to
totalitarian civil servants. Political Islam—and the headscarf—were also
seen as oppressing women. The outrages committed against women in
Afghanistan and Algeria in the name of political Islam are well known.27
In Germany, political Islam is seen by many as a symbol of gender
28
oppression. Like their French counterparts, German feminists suspected

22

Jere Longman, Surge in Racist Mood Raises Concerns on Ease of World Cup, NEW
YORK TIMES, June, 4, 2006. This continued threat of anti-foreigner violence undercuts
Germany’s effort to present itself as tolerant nation, as for example when non-white
visitors to the World Cup were warned to stay away from the small towns in
Brandenburg—the eastern German state that surrounds Berlin. Id.
23
See Pascale Fournier and Görçe Yurdakul, Unveiling Distribution: Muslim Women with
Headscarves in France and Germany in Michal Bodemann ed. MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP,
ETHNOS (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 175-76.
24
Id. at 174-75.
25
See Gerard Braunthal, POLITICAL LOYALTY & PUBLIC SERVICE: THE 1972 DECREE
AGAINST RADICALS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1990). The German model of the politically neutral civil servant goes back at least
to the nineteenth century. The lack of political will to fight the Nazis only increased the
importance of a politically neutral civil service. It also led to a determination to purge
extremists and totalitarians of all kinds. Id. at 3-9. Sometimes this had odd results, as
when the Germans target the Scientologists for governmental observation on the theory
that they are a totalitarian cult, or when they target the Jehovah’s Witnesses as totalitarian
solely because their members do not vote in elections. Michael Browne, Should Germany
Stop Worrying and Love the Octopus? Freedom of Religion and the Church of
Scientology, 9 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 155 (1998); Edward J. Eberle, Free Exercise
of Religion in Germany and the United States, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1035
(2004)(describing the Jehovah’s Witnesses).
26
Braunthal, POLITICAL LOYALTY AND PUBLIC SERVICE, at 22-40.
27
For an overview of how Muslim fundamentalists view women, see Johannes J.G.
Jansen, THE DUAL NATURE OF FUNDAMENTALISM, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
1997) at 138-57.
28
In the debate over the passage of a headscarf ban in the Baden-Württemberg legislature,
education minister Annette Schavan (CDU) explicitly linked fundamentalist Islam with
inferior treatment for women. See Das Kreuz mit dem Kopftuch, GOETHE-INSTITUT, Mar.

5

that most women who wore the headscarf did not do so of their own free
will, rather they did so because their fathers and brothers forced them to.
Consequently, they tended to downplay the possibility of women wearing
the headscarf as a form of self-expression and, more generally, that some
forms of Islamist activism provided women opportunities to express
29
themselves in a politically modern way.
While disapproval of German feminists of political Islam and the
headscarf was genuine, others not known for their feminism latched on to
gender oppression to give the critique of political Islam as totalitarian
more weight.30 This was true especially of those who wanted to ban the
headscarf, while allowing the crucifix (both on school walls and as a piece
of clothing) despite the history of the Catholic Church in denying equal
opportunity to women—a history that in Germany extended not just to the
priesthood, but also to positions in theology schools.31
B. Germany’s Christian Heritage
If the debate of Fereshta Ludin’s headscarf turned into an exercise
of comparative guilt by association in which accusations of totalitarianism
and patriarchy competed with accusations of anti-foreigner racism,32 one
factor muddied the waters—religion.33 As convenient as it might be for

10, 2004. Likewise, she called the headscarf “part of the history of women’s
suppression.” Czucka, supra note 5.
29
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opportunity for personal and political development. See Women’s Islamic Activism:
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30
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German opponents of the headscarf to look across the Rhine to the French
ban on headscarves, they rarely did do so. This was because the French
model of strict separation between church and state was even a greater
34
threat than the headscarves.
Although the Basic Law forbids the establishment of a state
35
religion, German courts and lawmakers have had little difficulty referring
explicitly to Germany’s Christian heritage. This can be seen in decisions
of the Federal Constitutional Court36 and in the constitutions of the federal
states (Länder) that trumpet this fact.37 It also reflects a set of institutional
structures. German visas ask the holder to identify as belonging to either
the Catholic or Evangelical (Protestant) Church. These churches are
38
supported through a system of church taxation. The state also provides
39
for religious instruction in schools.
The roots of these practices go back to the Protestant Reformation.
At the time of the Reformation, Germany was divided into small
principalities. The Reformation unleashed a century of political and
religious ferment and great suffering as Protestants and Catholics took
turns persecuting each other.40 Out of this conflict emerged the idea that
each principality should determine the religious practice for its own
subjects. This principle, enshrined in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which
ended the Thirty Years War, sought to dampen religious conflict between
Catholic and Protestants by linking religious boundaries with state
41
boundaries. (This use of the state to dampen religious conflict stands in

STATES AND GERMANY, (Report by American Institute for Contemporary German
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2005) at 11.
34
The Ludin Majority, at ¶¶ at 43, 44 explicitly rejects the “strict separation of church and
state.” In a review article on the Ludin case Axel Frhr. Von Campenhausen, who
specializes on church state relations at Gottingen, rejected the French approach of
“radical laicism” noting that “Germany…in comparison to other European countries has
long been a model in the field of religious freedom.” See The German Headscarf
Debate, 2004 B.Y.U.L. REV. 665, 697. 698.
35
Basic Law, Art 140 (incorporating Art. 137 of the Weimar Constitution).
36
For example, in the School Prayer Case, 52 BVerfGE 223 (1979)(cited in Kommers
supra note 4, at 461-66), which upheld voluntary prayer in state schools, the court noted
the “recognition of Christianity as a formative cultural and educational factor which has
developed in Western history.”. Id. at 463.
37
Both the Constitutions of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria refer explicitly to
“reverence for God” as something worthy of instilling in its citizens. Baden-Württemberg
Constitution, Art. 12(1); Bavarian Constitution, Art. 131.
38
Eberle, supra note 25, at 1031-32.
39
Kommers, supra note 4, at 471.
40
Ozment, supra note 20, at 104-05, 121. More generally, the Reformation made “the
organization of religion…the responsibility of political leaders.” Rolf Schieder, supra
note 33, at 14.
41
This perspective influences how ordinary people understand “church”—while
Americans think of their neighborhood church, Germans think of the Vatican or, in the
case of Protestants, the end of World War I, when Protestantism lost its status as the state
religion. See Scheider, supra note 33 at 13.
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contrast to the United States, where the state’s involvement in religion is
seen to enhance religious conflict.)
This Westphalian practice continued after 1871 when the German
states, including Baden and Württemberg, were incorporated into the
42
German Reich. The entry of the Catholic South into unified Germany
did, however, led to religious conflict as the Protestant majority enacted a
series of laws aimed at restricting the role of Catholicism in public life.
These laws—supported by a coalition of Bismarckian conservatives and
Protestant liberals—became known as the Kulturkampf (clash of cultures).
The conflict petered out in the late1870s as Bismarck turned his attention
to other foes, including the Socialists. However, the Catholic Center Party,
which served as a counterweight to Bismarck, remained a part of the
German political scene during the Second Reich and Weimar periods
(1871-1933).
While the Nazis dissolved the principalities and created a unitary
Germany, the post-war creators of the Federal Republic opted for a federal
system. As a result each state (Länder) had control over the education
system. Moreover, in light of the Nazi experience, which was seen as the
result of Godless materialism, Germany adopted an explicitly religious
identity which—even though it was framed in terms of Christianity—
43
stood for religion in general. (This religious identity also reflected the
Federal Republic’s status as a frontline state in the Cold War.)44 This
ecumenical trend is likewise evident in the rise of the Christian
Democratic Union—a grouping that included Protestants and Catholics.
These trends have had some important implications for
understanding the Ludin case. For one thing, in describing the duties of
schools, the constitution of Baden-Württenberg makes reference to
45
“reverence for God” and “the spirit of Chiristian afterlife.” Likewise, the
Baden-Württemberg constitution authorizes the esbablishment of Christian
community schools.46 The strength of the connection between Christianity
and the public schools was shown by the public outcry in 1997 when the

42
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German Constitutional Court held that the state of Bavaria could not
47
require individual schools to hang crucifixes on the walls of classrooms.
Support for the crucifix united both sides of the headscarf debate.
Supporters of Fereshta Ludin saw it as a reason not to ban the headscarf;48
opponents sought to distinguish the two symbols by arguing that the
headscarf, unlike the crucifix, was not a religious symbol but a political
49
symbol. Very few participants in the debate supported a sharp secularist
position that would ban both headscarves and crucifixes.
C. Protecting Germany’s Children from Islam
How then, did the Federal Constitutional Court address these
concerns? A majority of five judges narrowly ruled that the Stuttgart
school authority was wrong to reject Ms. Ludin’s job application.50 The
Court ruled that the legislature, not the civil service, was best suited to
balance Ms. Ludin’s rights to freedom of expression against the rights of
parents and students to a neutral classroom environment.51 As noted above,
this ruling was narrow—and it left an easy fix for the legislature, a
development which led supporters of headscarves to attack the decision as
cowardly.52 However, it did differ from the dissent, which would have held
that Ms. Ludin, as a public servant on duty, had no right to express her
53
religious beliefs in public. The dissenters also faulted the majority for not
giving Baden-Württemberg warning of its ruling, so that it could pass a
law before Ms. Ludin entered the civil service.54
For its frame of reference, the majority relied on the administrative
courts, which had twice rejected Ms. Ludin’s claims, 55 largely on the basis
that, as an authority figure, her use of the headscarf would influence the

47

93 BVerfGE 1 (1995)(cited in Kommers, supra note 6, at 472-82. The decision led to
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note 32.
48
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for it. See notes 83-85 infra, and accompanying text.
49
This was especially true of the dissenters. See Ludin Dissent, at ¶¶ 113, 117.
50
Ludin Majority, at ¶ 29.
51
Id. at ¶¶ at 62-64.
52
Martin Klingst, Feige Richter, DIE ZEIT, Sep. 25, 2004.
53
Ludin Dissent, at ¶ 135.
54
Id. at ¶ 138. Moreover, as a civil servant, Ms. Ludin would have lifetime tenure. In
actual fact, Ms. Ludin decided to teach in an Islamic school instead.
55
After the Stuttgart school district rejected her claim, Ms. Ludin sued in the
Administrative courts of first Stuttgart (2000), then Baden Württemberg (2001) and
ultimately the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin (2002). She lost all three times. For
an overview, see the Ludin Majority, at ¶¶ 5-15.
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students.56 The majority took this concern very seriously—so seriously that
the court invited a series of scholars to testify as to how a teacher wearing
57
a headscarf would impact students. In ruling that Baden-Württemberg
required a law to ban headscarves, the court noted that none of the experts
had found that exposing children to a headscarf would lead to religious
conversion or conflicts with other teachers.58 Moreover, Ms. Ludin said
that, if necessary she would be willing to wear the scarf as a shawl—only
59
putting it on when an adult entered the room.
Despite this, the concern about influence and conversion plays a
major rhetorical role in the majority ruling. Like the dissent, the majority
asserts that missionary activity in the classroom violates the teacher’s duty
60
as a civil servant to act with neutrality and moderation. It also violates
the “negative rights” of the school children and their parents to be free
from religious influences they do not share—especially those in the
classroom, from which there is no escape.61 The dissent goes a step further
and asserts students will be too intimidated by the teacher to raise any
complaints.62 Moreover, the dissent also disagrees with how the majority
treats the threat of “influence”—if the authority has to wait for proof of
unwanted influence on the students, it will be too late.63 On the broader
issue—the power of the headscarf to mold children’s minds (in a way the
crucifix does not)—the dissent and majority are in near total agreement.
The two sides do, however, take sharply different views of the
headscarf itself. After describing the many different motives a Muslim
woman could have for wearing a headscarf—preserving her identity in the
Diaspora, indicating her unavailability for sex, expressing her religious
orientation—the court concludes that the headscarf cannot be reduced to a
64
symbol of the oppression of women. The court concedes that Ms. Ludin
could plausibly be wearing the headscarf out of religious grounds and that
the wearing of the headscarf could foster the integration of Muslim
56

Ludin Majority at ¶ 25. The court rejected Ms. Ludin’s argument that schools should
not be a refuge from religious pluralism. See id. at ¶ 19.
57
Id. at ¶ 28. These experts included Dr. E. Kirchof, who represented the Stuttgart school
district; Director of Psychology, Ms. Leinenbrach (also of the Stuttgart school district),
who testified as about the influence of religious symbols on children); and Dr.
Karakasgolu of Essen, who testified about the reasons Muslim women choose to wear the
headscarf.
58
Id. at ¶¶ 56, 57. The Ludin Dissent, at ¶ 121 raises another concern—that Ms. Ludin’s
headscarf would make her Muslim students who do not veil feel uncomfortable.
59
Wieviel fremde religion verträgt unsere Gesellschaft—Erste Stellungnahmen aus der
Verhandlung, AFP (Agence France-Presse), Jun. 3, 2003. Wearing a shawl in front of
the children would still accord with her Islamic beliefs; however, adult visitors would
have to knock before entering the classroom.
60
Ludin at ¶ 49.
61
Id. at ¶ 46. However, the court would leave it to the state legislature to work out the
specific details.
62
Ludin Dissent, at ¶ 112.
63
Id. at ¶¶ 104, 111.
64
Ludin Majority, at ¶ 52.
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women.65 However, after this extended discussion, the court announces
that the subjective intent of the wearer is irrelevant; what matters is its
objective impact on the observer—which leads the court back to a
66
discussion of the danger it poses for students and parents.
The dissenters take a much darker view of the headscarf, which
they view as a symbol both of political Islam and of the subordination of
67
women. Because this view is shared by many people in the Muslim
world, it does not matter that some women wear the headscarf as a sign of
liberation.68 Furthermore, the covering of the head is not compatible with
the “German constitutional understanding” of human worth, which the
court summarizes with the pithy phrase: “The free person shows their
69
face.”
In addition, the dissent puts great emphasis on the fact that the
German school teacher is a civil servant. She is not seeking protection
70
from the state, rather she is seeking to become part of it. In that role she
has no standing to demand religious rights. Every right she takes will be at
the expense of the clients she serves.71 Not only that, every conflict that
results from Ms. Ludin wearing her headscarf will make the civil service
less efficient.72 In addition, it will hinder the role of the civil service which
73
is to provide a counterweight to the political branches. On the other hand,
the crucifix that stands on classroom walls is a general symbol of a
tolerant culture drawn from Jewish and Christian sources.74
The majority, by contrast, struggled with the crucifix analogy. On
the one hand, it tried a few times to distinguish the headscarf from the
crucifix.75 On the other hand, in its instructions to the Baden-Württemberg
legislature, it did not say whether anti-headscarf laws also had to ban
crucifixes.76 Instead it held that the Länder must fall back on their
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Id. at ¶ 53
Id. at ¶¶ 53, 56.
67
Ludin Dissent, at ¶ at 117.
68
Id. at ¶ at 122.
69
Id. at ¶ 123. The reference to a “German” constitutional understanding comes
immediately after the dissent’s expression of sympathy for Muslims opposed to the
headscarf.
70
Id. at ¶ 81.
71
Id. at ¶ 86.
72
Id. at ¶ 100.
73
Id. at ¶ 96.
74
Id. at ¶ 113. Later the dissent—in its discussion of potential anti-headscarf legislation—
asks whether the ban must include a small personal cross worn as jewelry that carries no
significant message and therefore is unlikely to lead to a conflict of worldviews. Id. at ¶
133.
75
Id. at ¶¶ 50-51. The majority asserted that the headscarf, unlike the crucifix, does not
have a meaning independently of its wearer. The court then related how the headscarf can
be seen as a symbol of political Islam.
76
The dissent attacked the majority on this point. Ludin Dissent, at ¶¶ 132-33.
66
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traditions when making new laws77—making it unclear whether it is
referring to the types of symbols allowed or the general habit of allowing
78
religious symbols. Moreover, the court’s warning that the new laws
should not discriminate on the basis of religion has not stopped several
Länder from passing laws that explicitly outlaw the headscarf.
D. The Utility of Political Islam as a Threat
The political, legal and scholarly reaction to the Ludin case largely
followed the themes laid out above. Most participants stressed Germany’s
religious heritage. Among politicians, this position was shared by former
79
Federal President Johannes Rau as well as Bavarian president Edmund
Stoiber80 and former then chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who opposed
them. (While Schröder stated that Germany was a “secular” county, he
81
also stressed Germany’s Judeo-Christian roots.) Moreover, most political
parties joined together in supporting headscarf bans. Moreover, the bans
occurred not only in the Catholic South (Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg)
but also in other parts of Germany that are less religiously conservative
such as Berlin, Bremen, Lower Saxony, Hesse and, most recently,
82
Nordrhein-Westfallen.
Nor has the headscarf ruling placed the crucifix in doubt. In fact,
when Johannes Rau, in his 2004 New Year’s address, argued rhetorically
that if the state wanted to ban the headscarf he would also have to ban the
crucifix, he unleased an outcry of criticism accusing him of secularism.83
In response, Edmund Stoiber accused Rau of “cast[ing] doubt on our
national identity distinguished by the Christian religion.”84 (However,
Pope Benedict XVI, then Cardinal Ratzinger, responded by supporting

77

Ludin Majority, at ¶ 71.
Rux, supra note 43, at 11.
79
Rau referred to Germany as a Christian believing land for several centuries. Rede zum
275. Geburtstag von Gottfried Ephraim Lessing, Jan. 22, 2004.
80
Regierigunserklärung des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Edmund Stoiber, Nov.
6, 2003.
81
Gerhard Schröder, Interview, WELT AM SONNTAG, Dec. 21, 2003. Schröder also traced
Germany’s roots in “Greco-Roman philosophy” and the Enlightenment. Id.
82
Interestingly the Berlin law banned crucifixes, yarmulkes, and turbans as well as
headscarves. This may be because of the role of the PDS in the Berlin government. See
Berlin City Bans Headscarves, DPA, Mar. 31, 2004.
83
In opposing the headscarf bans Rau said that “if the headscarf is an expression of
religious faith, a dress with missionary character, then that could apply equally to a
monk’s habit or a crucifix.” Hijab Causes a Major Row in Germany, Jan. 2, 2004
(available on aljazeera.net). Later, in response to criticism, Rau explained that a headscarf
ban would be a first step toward a lay state, in which all symbols were banned and that
the future of Christianity in Germany depended on the strength of beliefs of the
Christians themselves. Rede zum 275. Geburtstag von Gottfried Ephraim Lessing, Jan.
22, 2004.
84
Hijab Causes a Major Row in Germany, Jan. 2, 2004 (available on aljazeera.net).
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both the crucifix and the headscarf—so Rau’s strategy may have borne
85
some fruit.).
The main debate focused on the role of the headscarf as regards
political Islam and the repression of women. Women’s groups came down
on both sides of the issue. The Women’s Initiative Against the Headscarf
Ban gathered the signatures of a number of prominent women from the
political and artistic world, including former Bundestag President Rita
Sussmuth, and Kohl-era Justice Minister, Sabine LeutheusserSchnarrenberger, to sign a petition opposing the bans.86 Meanwhile, a
group of Turkish speaking women opposed to the headscarf, led by Lale
Akgün, a Turkish member representing the Social Democrats in the
federal parliament, wrote an open letter to the Minister of Immigrant
Affairs, Marie Luise Beck, which stressed that religion should be a private
affair and that those who “under the influence of the Islamists” chose to
wear the headscarf in public life should not be eligible for the civil
87
service.
Supporters of the headscarf argued, as did the majority, that many
women wore the headscarf as a sign of self-emancipation.88 Some also
played the anti-racism card by accusing those opposed to the headscarf of
being unwilling to accept that a veiled women could be anything other
than a cleaning woman or fruit vendor.89
On the other side stood those, such as Margot Käßmann, the
Bishop of the Evangelical Church in Hannover, who argued that the
headscarf represented a step back from gender equality, something women
had long fought for.90 She also accused Ms. Ludin of letting herself be
used by the Islamists, who sought to establish an Islamic legal order, and
criticized her efforts fostering a compromise by wearing her veil as a
85

Id. The Pope, while finding Rau’s religious beliefs “strange,” said that “I will not forbid
any Muslim to wear a headscarf, but still less do we accept a ban on wearing the
crucifix.”
86
Das Kreuz mit dem Kopftuch, GOETHE INSTITUT, Mar. 10, 2004. They emphasized
their position with the slogan: “The decisive thing is not what’s on the head, but what’s in
it.” Headscarf Issue Rears its Head Again, Deutsche Welle, Dec. 2, 2003
87
Lale Akgün, Wider die Kulturaliserung des Kopftuch-Diskurses. May 3, 2004
(available at Qantara. de).
88
The Woman’s Initiative made this point. Headscarf Issue Rears its Head Again,
Deutsche Welle, Dec. 2, 2003. Fereshta Ludin herself made the same point when she
argued that even a headscarf wearing woman can have secular thoughts. Wieviel fremde
religion verträgt unsure Gesellschaft—Erste Stellungnahmen aus der Verhandlung, AFP
(Agence France-Presse), Jun. 3, 2003.
89
Jochen
Bauer,
KONFLICTSTUFF
KOPFTUCH
(available
at
http://www.verlagruhr.de/archiv/kopftuch.html). Martin Klingst, writing in DIE ZEIT
made a similar point—headscarf-wearing women are not shuttered, repressed creatures
but are, instead, modern women who work in a wide variety of fields including as
computer experts, insurance agents, and, when they are qualified, as teachers. Martin
Klingst, Feige Richter, DIE ZEIT Sep. 25, 2004.
90
Schule sollte Freiheit vermitteln, interview on Tagesschau.de., Sep. 24, 2003.
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shawl—these efforts would only create “a climate of fear.”91 Finally,
Käßmann criticized the headscarf itself as incompatible with a “liberal
Islam” that accepted the separation of church and state and equality for
92
women. Likewise, Lela Akgün views the hijab in political terms: “The
Islamic headscarf symbolizes Islam no more than Mao’s uniform
represents Chinese civilization.”93
The concern about the headscarf is quite similar to the rationale
behind German laws that ban the Nazi salute and Swastika. These symbols
are criminalized not because they risk offending anyone, but because they
express support for right-wing extremists who commit violent acts against
foreigners.94 (This is why German authorities chose not to prosecute an
African soccer star who responded to racist taunts by a crowd in a soccer
game in Eastern Germany with the Hitler salute; the prosecutors
recognized that he was using the salute to criticize racism not to support
it.)95 For this very reason, German feminists who opposed the headscarf
rejected the label of racist. According to Alice Schwarzer: “The true
racists are those who, in the name of a falsely understood tolerance,”
promote “the ghettoization of Muslims in Germany.”96
Mainstream politicians also expressed concern about political
Islam. At one extreme stand those, such as Helmut Schmidt, former
chancellor of Germany from 1974-83, who called political Islam
Germany’s number one problem and expressed regret that Germany
97
permitted the guest workers to arrive. Likewise, Edward Stoiber
suggested that those migrants who came to Germany had to accept that it
was a Christian Western country and follow its rules.98 Even some
supporters of the headscarf took this position—but they made two
“tactical” arguments: i) excluding people like Fereshta Ludin from the
civil service risked aiding Islamists by further isolating religious minded
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Id.
Id.
93
Lale Akgün, Wider die Kulturaliserung des Kopftuch-Diskurses. May 3, 2004
(available at Qantara. de).
94
The same logic applies to laws against Holocaust Denial. See Robert A. Kahn,
HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2004).
95
Longman, “Surge in Racist Mood,” NEW YORK TIMES, Jun. 4. 2006.
96
“Kopftuch-Streit beschäftigt das Verfassungsgericht, (AFP), Jun. 2, 2003.
97
Klausen, supra note 17, at 26. Sometimes concerns about migration, however, trumped
the headscarf. For example, Bavaria required four Iranian asylum-seekers to pose for
identity cards wearing the headscarf. The authorities reasoned that, if the four women lost
their asylum claim, it would be easier to deport them to Iran. Jochen Bauer,
KONFLICTSTOFF KOPFTUCH, supra note 89.
98
Regierigunserklärung des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Edmund Stoiber, Nov.
6, 2003. Stoiber argued that the headscarf both “documents” and “propagates” foreign
values. Id.
92
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Muslims from the larger community;99 and ii) there were better places to
fight the battle for women’s rights, such as forced marriages and honor
100
killings.
Overall, however, the German society is united in its opposition to
political Islam, which—whatever the actual danger it poses—is very well
suited as a symbolic threat. As a “totalitarian ideology” it fits in nicely
with a state that was born out of the ashes of one such ideology (Nazism)
and spent most of its formative years fighting another (Communism).101 It
also allows Germans to express unease about the rising political salience
of German Muslims—and the fact that Germany is now a “country of
immigration”—without being labeled as racist. (Interestingly, the term
“political Islam” expresses the idea that Muslims have politics).
The fears of a multicultural Germany also express themselves in
other aspects of the debate. The dissenters’ reference to an explicitly
“German” constitutional understanding breaks with a taboo Germans had
102
in the post-Holocaust era of identifying themselves as German.
Furthermore, both the dissent and majority express concern that the school
children will be exposed to a foreign (Fremde) religion103—words that
exclude Muslims from the classroom (and the political community), a
somewhat contradictory position for the dissent, given its reliance on nonheadscarf wearing Muslim students as likely victims of Ms. Ludin’s
headscarf.
To sum up, the German headscarf debate has focused on fears
rooted in German history—concerns about totalitarianism, secularism,
women’s rights and migration. These fears are encapsulated in political
Islam, an ideological Other against which the state can define itself. A
similar process took place in the United States, but in America the Muslim
Other took a different form.
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According to supporters of the Women’s Initiative, a ban on headscarves would play
into the hands of the fundamentalists by isolating Muslim women from the rest of the
society. Das Kreuz mit dem Kopftuch, GOETHE INSTITUT, Mar. 10, 2004.
100
See, e.g., Martin Klingst, Feige Richter, DIE ZEIT, Sep. 25, 2004. Former President
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language. Rede zum 275. Geburtstag von Gottfried Ephraim Lessing, Jan. 22, 2004.
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revival of anti-Communist ideology as Germans worked to come to terms with the East
German past.
102
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III.
UNITED STATES: HEADSCARF AS A TOOL FOR TERRORISTS
A. The Limits of Religious Sincerity
Sultaana Freeman’s request to be photographed for a driver’s
license wearing a headscarf showing only her eyes touched off concerns
about security in a post 9/11 age. Whether one watched the trial on CourtTV, or heard the talking heads on the Chris Matthews or Geraldo Rivera
shows, the message was clear—Freeman was about the limits a society
must place on religious freedom during times of crisis. Justice Jackson,
dissenting in Terminello v. Chicago, at the start of the Cold War, warned
that overly doctrinaire court rulings would “convert the constitutional bill
of rights into a suicide pact.”104 But a funny thing happened on the way to
the suicide pact, Judge Thorpe, in ruling against Freeman, while
mentioning 9/11, explicitly based her decision on another ground, the
same ground that the Circuit Court of Appeals used to affirm Judge
Thorpe’s denial—that Freeman had not shown how the license
105
requirement burdened her. This, in turn, rested on a series of doubts—
doubts about Freeman’s religious sincerity and doubts about how a DMV
(or court) could assess the sincerity of other religious applicants.
On one level, the concern about sincerity flows directly from the
events of September 11, 2001. Several of the terrorists who blew up the
World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon obtained Florida driver’s
licenses—albeit ones with photos. On this view, one can hardly blame
Florida for being a little gunshy as to whom it grants licenses
However, I would suggest that the suspicion of Ms. Freeman was
not simply pragmatic. Rather it reflected a renewed questioning of
religious beliefs as such at a time when Islam was becoming increasingly
visible in the United States. As such, Freeman (and the debate
surrounding it) marks a contraction of the principle first stated in Ballard
106
v. United States (1944) that a court cannot inquire into the truth or falsity
of a religious belief—only whether the belief in question is sincerely held.
At the time Ballard was seen both as revolutionary (since it amounted in
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337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949)(Jackson, J., dissenting). The petitioner in Terminello was
charged with breach of the peace for making an incendiary speech that riled up the crowd
against him. Id. at 2. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas found the absence of a
clear and present danger and reversed the conviction. Id. at 5.
105
Judge Thorpe ruled against Ms. Freeman in June 2003. Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619.
In September 2005, a Florida Circuit Court affirmed Judge Thorpe’s ruling. Freeman v.
Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, (Case No. 5D03-2296, decided Sep. 2,
2005, available on findlaw.com). Ms. Freeman then applied for rehearing, which the
Circuit Court granted before, in March 2006, again affirming Judge Thorpe’s ruling.
Freeman v. Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 924 So.2d 48 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
2006).
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322 U.S. 882 (1944)
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effect to a ban on prosecutions for religious fraud)107 and incoherent in
108
practice (since truth is often a powerful way to demonstrate sincerity).
Ballard was one of a number of decisions, such as Barnette v. West
Virginia State Board of Education,109 which greatly expanded the scope of
religious freedom in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. These cases almost always
involved Protestant groups (typically Jehovah’s Witnesses, although
Ballard involved the “I Am” movement). In basing religious freedom on
the subjective belief of the claimant, American courts charted a potentially
much broader course for religious freedom than did their German
counterparts who always looked to the objective impact of the claimant’s
religious belief on others.110
And for a long time, the Ballard principle was applied quite
broadly—at least in cases involving religious exemptions for driver’s
licenses. In Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer
(1978),111 Quaring v. Peterson (1984),112 and Dennis v. Charnes (1986),113
the courts took the sincerity of the religiously motivated plaintiffs for
granted. Of course, it did not hurt that the plaintiffs in all these cases came
from the same type of Protestant sects that had such success in the earlier
religious freedom cases.114 Moreover, in each of the cases, the courts
involved found that the conditioning of a driver’s license on taking a photo
burdened the plaintiff’s religious beliefs.115 This required, however, an
evidentiary showing that the plaintiff needed the car for their daily life.
For example, the plaintiff in Charnes worked as a painter and needed a
truck to get around.116 Likewise, one of the plaintiffs in Pentecostal House
107

Chief Justice Stone, writing in dissent, made this point. Id. at 887 (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting).
108
Justice Jackson made this point in his dissent—which argued that the majority in
Ballard did not go far enough in protecting religious liberty. Id. at 889 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
109
319 U.S. 624 (1943)(invalidating compulsory flag salute in a case involving the
Jehovah’s Witnesses); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)(upholding
right of Jehovah’s Witness to play an anti-Catholic phonograph record as part of his
effort to proselytize on the street).
110
One reason for this may be the privileged place of Protestant groups—both mainstream
and breakaway sects—in American religious life. For more see, Harold Bloom, THE
AMERICAN RELIGION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE POST-CHRISTIAN NATION, (New York:
Touchstone, 1992) at 16 (arguing that American faith is scriptural and best represented by
“African-American religionists, the Mormons, the Pentecostals, and other peculiarly
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111
380 N.E. 2d at 1228.
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728 F.2d at 1123, 1125.
113
646 F.Supp. at 162.
114
Pentecostal House of Prayer involved a Pentecostal Church and a group of Amish who
drive. 380 N.E.2d at 1226. Likewise, the plaintiff in Quaring attended a Pentecostal
church. 728 F.2d at 1123. The plaintiff in Charnes belonged to the cult of
YHWHHOSHUA, a small Protestant sect.
115
Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1125; Charnes, 646 F.Supp. at 162; Pentecostal House of Prayer,
380 N.E. 2d at 1228.
116
646 F.Supp. at 160.
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of Prayer needed a car to visit the sick and perform religious services.117 In
general, in these cases involving Christian sects, the courts took the
plaintiffs at their word—both as to their religious beliefs as well as to
118
evidence that the photo license requirement burdened them.
This was not Sultaana Freeman’s experience. To be sure, the court
did find that she sincerely believed that Islam commanded her to use the
119
veil. But this is where the court’s trust in her ended. On the one hand,
the court took issue with another of her beliefs, namely her view that Islam
commanded her to avoid all contact with images of human faces and
animals.120 To support this view—which is extremely similar to the beliefs
of the plaintiff in Quaring, who said that the Second Commandment
forbade the use of graven images121—Freeman testified that she did not let
her children play with dolls with human faces and that she scratched off
such images with a magic marker on all goods she brought into the house
from the supermarket.122 Again, this is quite similar to Quaring.123 But the
court did not accuse Ms. Freeman of plagiarism. Rather they said that
because her husband—who claimed he shared his wife’s beliefs as part of
a family unit—allowed himself to be photographed, Ms. Freeman’s beliefs
about avoiding images was insincere.124
But this was not the reason Judge Thorpe ruled against Ms.
Freeman. Rather, the decisive issue was Ms. Freeman’s failure to show
precisely how the license regulation burdened her. Judge Thorpe thought
this point was sufficiently important to put it in italics.125 And, on one
level, Judge Thorpe has an argument. Ms. Freeman’s complaint filed by
the South Florida ACLU says that the license regulation burdens Ms.
Freeman but does not say why.126 So, the complaint may be poorly drafted.
But Judge Thorpe also disregarded the Christian license cases, which held
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380 N.E.2d at 1228.
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`Religious Question’ Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and
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Id. at * 3.
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728 F.2d at 1123. The plaintiffs in Charnes and Pentecostal House of Prayer had
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Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619 at * 3.
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According to the court, the plaintiff in Quaring “refuses to allow decorations in her
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125
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that the lack of access to a car constituted the burden.127 These cases were
mentioned by Ms. Freeman’s attorney, Howard Marks, in his opening
128
statement and Judge Thorpe made extensive use of them in the part of
her opinion where, in dicta, she held that even if Ms. Freeman had shown
a burden, there was a compelling state interest in requiring a full-face
photo.129
Without access to the complete records of the trial, it is hard to
determine whether Judge Thorpe’s conclusion on burden is the result of
poor lawyering on Mr. Marks’ part or whether the court is applying a
double standard when it comes to Muslims. The two appellate decisions,
however, supply more evidence of a double standard. The first ruling
came down in September 2005.130 The court reviewed the testimony of
experts brought in by Ms. Freeman and the State of Florida to discuss the
role of veiling in Islam. The state’s expert, Dr. El Fadl, testified that
although some Muslims believe the Qur’an compels them to veil, this duty
is subject to the doctrine of “necessity” which allows the woman to take
off the veil in order to take a photo; he added that women in Saudi Arabia
take full-face photos for identity cards.131 In response, Ms. Freeman
solicited testimony from Professor Saif Ul-Islam, who claimed that the
doctrine of necessity applied only to life or death circumstances.132
Here one might pause and ask why, under Ballard, such testimony
was necessary. Assuming Ms. Freeman’s beliefs about veiling are sincere,
why does it matter whether others follow them, especially since the court
in Ballard refused to inquire into the beliefs of the “I Am” movement, a
group that even Justice Jackson, its staunchest defender in the Ballard case
(he would have prevented the court from looking at truth or necessity),133
described as more humbug than truth? Moreover, why didn’t Judge
Thorpe or the Court of Appeals reject Ms. Freeman’s belief on the basis of
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Id. at 5-6.
133
322 U.S. at 889 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John T.
Noonan, Jr. argues that the court was too harsh in its assessment of the “I Am”
movement. Writing 40 years after the fact, Noonan describes the movement as mixing
“the moral exhortations of St. Paul in his letters to the Corinthians with some of the selfhelp optimism of a Dale Carnegie and…traces of Buddhist belief in reincarnation.”
Noonan, How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 713,
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the state’s compelling interest in promoting secure identification for law
enforcement?
Be that as it may. After mentioning this evidence, and discussing
the doctrine of burden at great length, the court concluded that Ms.
Freeman did not establish a burden because she said in deposition
134
testimony that she agreed she could be photographed without the veil.
Since this contradicts what Ms. Freeman said throughout her trial, one
might have expected the court to have lodged this as an attack on her
sincerity. But the ruling, if true, at least would have resolved the case.
Ms. Freeman applied for a rehearing. In March 2006 the Circuit
Court removed the ruling (which included removing it from Lexis and
Westlaw; I obtained my copy of the 2005 ruling on the internet) and
replaced it with a new ruling, identical with the earlier one in almost every
respect, except the reference to Ms. Freeman’s deposition testimony.135 In
its place is a rehash of Dr. Fadl’s testimony about the necessity doctrine
combined with a footnote describing his academic credentials.136 (This
reads like a summary of a contributor to an edited volume. We learn that
Dr. Fadl “is a widely published author of texts and commentaries on
Islamic law, including the rules related to veiling.”)137
There was no mention of Ms. Freeman’s personal beliefs on the
subject of veiling or of the testimony of her expert, Professor Ul-Islam.
Nor did the court say anything about the earlier understanding of sincerity
and burden expressed in Quaring and Charnes. Part of this reflects a
change in First Amendment law heralded by Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.138Before Smith once
the plaintiff showed that a state practice placed a substantial burden on a
sincere religious belief, the state had to show a compelling state interest.139
Smith, however, held that once the state showed that the law was of
general applicability the plaintiff had to show that the state acted because
of the believer’s religious status.140 In response to Smith, many states—
including Florida—passed Religious Freedom Restoration Acts—which
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The new version adds a sentence explaining the change and corrects a single citation.
Otherwise, the two rulings are identical.
136
Freeman, 924 So.2d at 56.
137
Id. at 56, n.9.
138
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(1963)(extending unemployment benefits to a worker who refused to work on the
sabbath).
140
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; see also Church of the Lukimi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
505 U.S. 520, 534-35 (1993)(restrictions on slaughter of animals were found to be not
neutral).
135

20

restored the old compelling state interest.141 Ms. Freeman brought her case
142
under Florida’s RFRA, so the court followed the old test. But to the
extent Smith reflected a more general skepticism with the religious beliefs
of minority groups, one could see it as partially responsible for the shift
from Quaring and Charnes to Freeman.
But this is only part of the story. The court’s treatment of Ms.
Freeman also reflects a general societal skepticism about her beliefs as a
Muslim. Here two concerns were paramount. On the one hand, Americans
wanted to know why one of their “own” would convert, especially
someone who described herself as “your average, wholesome midwestern
143
girl.” This led Geraldo Rivera to ask Ms. Freeman how she arrived at
her Muslim faith, to which she countered by asking Mr. Rivera about his
144
faith. Conservative newspaper columnists, such as Diana West, harped
on the theme of betrayal. Writing in the Washington Times, Ms. West said
that “On the highway she’s a driver first, not a Muslim,” adding that
denying Ms. Freeman her driver’s license may have stopped a potential
terrorist.145
On the other hand, there were questions about how to assess
Islamic beliefs. The debate as framed by the appellate court featured a
clash of expert opinion about when the necessity doctrine applied to the
practice of veiling. Facing this issue in its March 2006 ruling, the court
picked the prosecution’s expert without explaining why. This is
problematic because, as Richard Bulliet suggests in his recent book, The
Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (2004), the current crisis in Islam is
one of institutions; in the absence of them, the definition of Islam is open
146
to anyone capable of releasing a videotape or pamphlet. The dangers of
this can be seen in the cable-TV universe, where, for example, Bill
O’Reilly based his rejection of Ms. Freeman’s claims on the basis of a
statement of a UCLA law professor that Islam does not require veiling.147
Added to this were direct attacks on Ms. Freeman’s sincerity. As
noted above, there were accusations that Mr. Freeman trafficked in phony
identification cards, in addition the press pointed out Ms. Freeman’s 1998
141
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arrest for abusing her foster children, which resulted in a mug shot that
148
appears on Wikipedia for the world to see. While the court did not
consider these issues worthy of consideration, they appeared on the
149
website of WFTV a local television station in Orlando.
The sincerity issue also arose in the context of the veil itself. Judge
Thorpe worried that wearers of full face cloaks would “pretend[] to
ascribe to religious beliefs in order to carry out activities that would
150
threaten lives.” Here Thorpe links the religiously insincere with
terrorists—a formulation that ignores the possibility that people could
commit acts of terror out of religious motives.
B. The Headscarf and National Security
Once the focus of the court—and the larger debate—turned to
national security the veil itself, not the person, became the focus of
concern. For this very reason, Judge Thorpe’s discussion of the
compelling state interest test was something of an anti-climax.
For one thing, some of the Christian driver’s license cases found a
compelling reason to require the photographs. In Johnson v. Motor Vehicle
Division, the state of Colorado, in an early case involving the cult of
YHWHHOSHUA, found a license photo served a compelling state interest
151
by assisting the police in making a rapid identification at a traffic stop.
Likewise, in cases involving pistol permits, and photos for suspects, courts
had little difficulty finding a compelling state interest.152
To be sure, Quaring and Charnes proved harder to escape. On the
one hand, these cases held that claims of a compelling state interest are
suspect when the state allows other types of drivers to get by with photo
free licenses, as Florida does.153 Nor does it necessarily matter that the
licenses are temporary, unless there is some evidence that (i) the state
requires a permanent photo on file; and (ii) the police in the field will have
access to it.154 Otherwise, the rapid law enforcement reaction time—so
vital for the Johnson court—is unlikely to occur.
148
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Ultimately, Florida met these hurdles fairly easily. Florida required
a permanent file photo for every recipient of a temporary license. The state
also had a driver and vehicle identification database (DAVID) which
according to a prosecution witness was in the process of being put into
place. For that reason, the judge had a fairly easy time distinguishing the
155
Christian sect cases as relying on “archaic technology.” The court went
so far as to point out that DAVID was under development before
September 11, 2001.156
The court’s explicit discussion of national security concerns was
relatively brief. The court notes that the past 25 years have seen “new
threats to public safety, including both foreign and domestic terrorism.”
Consequently, the plaintiff’s religious freedom must be subordinated to
the “safety and security of others.”157 However, Judge Thorpe stopped well
short of labeling Islam a security threat. Judge Thorpe, in direct response
to Ms. Freeman’s claim that she was singled out because of 9/11, wrote
that the court “would rule the same way for anyone—Christian, Jew,
158
Buddhist, Atheist.” The reader can decide whether she treated Ms.
Freeman’s Islamic religious beliefs with the same respect.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The German debate in the Ludin case focused on how a veil worn
by a school teacher impacted her students. This led to a debate over the
symbolic content of the headscarf in German society, a debate that focused
on political Islam, the repression of women, and fears of totalitarianism.
By contrast, the American debate focused less on the headscarf itself, than
on its wearer—Sultaana Freeman. As an American born convert to Islam,
she raised issues of motive (why did she do it?) and betrayal (was she the
next hijacker?).
These concerns reflected American fears in 2002 and 2003 about
the renewal of terrorist attacks, fears encapsulated by the Bush
Administrations manipulation of its multi-colored warning system, just as
the fears of religious indoctrination, and political Islam expressed fears of
a reunited Germany coming to terms with itself in a post-Holocaust era.
Interestingly, the fears do not overlap. No one in the German
debate for a moment suspected Fereshta Ludin, or political Islamists of
terrorism. Their goal was seen almost exclusively as the domination of
society—i.e. totalitarianism. Likewise, Ms. Freeman was not seen as an
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oppressed woman, or the representative of a political movement that
oppresses women. In fact, a board member of the National Organization
for Women attended a rally in support of Ms. Freeman’s right to veil if she
159
wishes. Nor do Americans share the German’s tendency to equate
Muslim political activism with totalitarianism. In fact, the movement to
allow driver’s licenses for hijab160 wearers in Alabama was spearheaded by
an African-American convert to Islam who is viewed as an up and coming
161
politician.
In an age of increasing Muslim migration and self-assertion, the
liberal democracies of the West will fall back on their own private fears,
shaped by national historical experience, and traditions. This, in turn,
suggests that there will be no one Western response to issues such as the
headscarf, the publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed,
or the issue of how best to incorporate Muslims into the folkways of
American and German societies. Each country will have its areas of fear
and suspicion—fears of terrorism and profiling of Muslims in the United
States; fear of Muslim political assertiveness and activism for Germans.
But, hopefully, each country will also have areas of greater toleration.
Only time will tell.
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